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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jessica Starr appeals from the district court’s decision affirming the
judgment entered upon the jury verdict finding Starr guilty of misdemeanor
possession of marijuana and paraphernalia. Starr contends the district court
erred in affirming the magistrate’s suppression and evidentiary rulings.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Starr was issued a citation for misdemeanor possession of marijuana.
(R., p.12.) Although Starr initially entered a written guilty plea, she later filed a
motion to withdraw her guilty plea, and the court granted that motion. (R., pp.14,
28-29, 31.) Starr then filed a motion to suppress “all evidence,” claiming the
evidence was “obtained as a result of an illegal search.” (R., pp.34, 37.) At the
suppression hearing, Officer Dennis Hammer testified that he was dispatched to
investigate a reckless driving call, which ultimately led him to Starr’s apartment.
(Tr., p.6, L.8 – p.7, L.19.) Before Officer Hammer “had even knocked on the
door,” he could “smell[ ] the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the
doorway.” (Tr., p.7, Ls.21-23.)
When Officer Hammer knocked on the door of Starr’s apartment, he
asked to speak to the reported reckless driver, Kenneth Young. (Tr., p.7, Ls.718.) Starr “walked back inside the residence and got Mr. Young.” (Tr., p.7,
Ls.18-19.) “As the door opened,” Officer Hammer “could smell [marijuana] even
more.” (Tr., p.7, L.25.)
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When Starr and Young returned to the door, Officer Hammer asked if he
could come inside; Starr said, “No.” (Tr., p.11, Ls.21-23.) Officer Hammer then
explained to Young why he was there and also told Starr and Young that he
could smell marijuana coming from the apartment. (Tr., p.12, L.11 – p.14, L.15.)
Officer Hammer asked, “So is there any way we can go inside and get that and
just deal with that issue?” (Tr., p.14, Ls.15-17.) Starr answered, “Can I just bring
you what I have out here?,” and Officer Hammer responded, “Well, can I just
step inside with you?” (Tr., p.14, Ls.18-21.) Starr said she would “rather just
bring it out,” and when Officer Hammer asked why, Starr answered, “I’ll give you
everything I have.”

(Tr., p.14, Ls.22-25.)

Officer Hammer and Starr then

engaged in the following exchange:
OFFICER HAMMER: I can hang outside your doorway, if you like.
I mean, I’m not looking to go through all your stuff or anything.
[STARR]: I’ll bring you everything I have out here.
OFFICER HAMMER: Okay. Which is what, though?
[STARR]: I have a pipe, and I have, like two or three bowls
(inaudible).
...
OFFICER HAMMER: Okay. Any weed left?
[STARR]: Yes.
OFFICER HAMMER: Any baggies.
[STARR]: No.
OFFICER HAMMER: Stuff in there?
[STARR]: No. It’s in a container, and I’ll bring that to you.
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(Tr., p.15, L.11 – p.16, L.12.)
Starr also told Officer Hammer she was “concerned about any drug
charges that may cause her to be evicted.” (Tr., p.17, Ls.8-11.) Officer Hammer
advised Starr she could “cooperate” or he could “request a warrant for [her]
arrest” based on the fact that he could smell marijuana and Starr had admitted
she had marijuana. (Tr., p.18, Ls.2-19.) Young encouraged Starr to cooperate,
stating, “We’ve go to work with him, he’ll work with us.” (Tr. p.19, Ls.10-11.)
Officer Hammer asked again if he could “step in” and Starr “eventually” opened
the door and allowed Officer Hammer to stand inside the door “while she
gathered the items.” (Tr., p.20, L.19, p.21, Ls.3-9, p.22, L.17 – p.23, L.25; see
also p.24, Ls.3-18.) Starr then went into her bedroom and, as she came out, she
closed the door behind her and “immediately apologized” for doing so. (Tr., p.24,
L.16 – p.25, L.5.)
“Several minutes after” Officer Hammered entered Starr’s apartment, the
assist officer he requested at the beginning of the encounter arrived. (Tr., p.10,
L.21 – p.11, L.6, p.28, Ls.10-20.) After Starr provided Officer Hammer with the
items from her bedroom, and after Officer Hammer contacted dispatch with the
names of the individuals who were present, Officer Hammer asked Starr if he
could check her room “to make sure” she had provided everything. (Tr., p.25,
L.14 – p.29, L.16.) Officer Hammer invited Starr to go with him and assured her
did not intend to “tear[ ] through [her] stuff or anything.” (Tr., p.29, Ls.16-18.)
Starr responded by stepping ahead of Officer Hammer, walking toward her room,
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and opening the door; Officer Hammer interpreted Starr’s actions as giving him
permission to go into her room. (Tr., p.30, Ls.3-18.)
Inside Starr’s room, Officer Hammer found another pipe. (Tr., p.30, L.20
– p.31, L.12.) At that point, Officer Hammer asked Starr if “there was anything
else,” and “asked her several times if [he could] search the room to make sure.”
(Tr., p.31, Ls.14-16.)

Starr “didn’t really answer, but she did tell [Officer

Hammer] that there was nothing else.” (Tr., p.31, Ls.16-18.) However, Starr
“walked over towards the bed stand area,” and when Officer Hammer asked her
to open the nightstand, Starr did, and Officer Hammer “noticed a bong inside.”
(Tr., p.31, Ls.18-20.)

Officer Hammer also asked about other items he

observed. (Tr., p.38, L.14 – p.44, L.22, p.51, L.2 – p.52, L.7.)
The magistrate denied Starr’s request to suppress the drugs and
paraphernalia Starr removed from her bedroom and brought to the table to give
to Officer Hammer, but granted her request to suppress any items found after
that. (Tr., p.65, Ls.14-16.) The magistrate found that Starr “allowed” Officer
Hammer “to step inside the door” and “allowed” him to “go to the table and
examine the things” she retrieved from her bedroom, but Starr did not “voluntarily
consent[ ] to any further search” because “she was put under a lot of pressure by
the circumstances she was in and was just caught up in the . . . wheedling that
continued” in relation to Officer Hammer’s requests to search Starr’s room. (Tr.,
p.64, L.4 – p.65, L.5.) The magistrate also found that Officer Hammer exceeded
the scope of his “agreement” with Starr, which only allowed him inside the door
and to take possession of the items Starr brought from her bedroom, but Officer
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Hammer “violat[ed]” the “agreement” by “ask[ing] for more and more consent to
search more and more areas.” (Tr., p.65, Ls.6-13.)
Starr proceeded to trial. (See generally Tr., pp.67-196.) Prior to trial, the
state also charged Starr with possession of paraphernalia. (R., p.45.) At trial,
the state sought to introduce portions of the audio recording of the interaction
between Officer Hammer and Starr. (Tr., p.80, Ls.11-15, p.81, Ls.7-11; see also
pp.93-96 (modifying exhibit numbers).) Starr moved to exclude portions of the
audio, arguing the statements she made to Officer Hammer were involuntary and
the product of the illegal search. (Tr., p.97, Ls.1-23.) The magistrate, noting that
Starr was essentially making an untimely request for suppression, denied her
motion after concluding Starr’s statements were not the result of Officer Hammer
exploiting the search the magistrate found was nonconsensual. (Tr., p.100, L.19
– p.103, L.10.)
Despite her previous objections and requests for suppression, after the
state rested, Starr indicated she wanted to play the entirety of the audio of the
interaction between her and Officer Hammer to “give a full understanding to the
jury” and to support a defense that her admissions were “unreliable.” (Tr., p.159,
L.6 – p.160, L.14.) The state objected. (Tr., p.160, L.17 – p.161, L.18.) The
magistrate ruled, in relevant part:
As to the evidence about the entirety of the encounter that
the officer had with Ms. Starr, I see that the argument could be
made that her admissions were not reliable evidence because of
the amount of pressure she was placed under by the officer.
I also see that the State is frustrated by the fact that all this
effort was put into suppressing this very evidence, and now it all
seems to be what the defense wants to introduce.
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The bigger issue is whether it gives the jury the impression
that somehow it was the State that was trying to limit the
information that they obtained and that the defense is now
heroically giving them the whole story, when, in fact, it’s exactly the
opposite of what occurred.
I think that’s very unfair to the State, that possibility. I don’t
know whether the jury would look at it that way or not, but that
possibility is very unfair to the State.
(Tr., p.162, Ls.1-18.)
The magistrate, therefore, denied Starr’s request to introduce the entirety
of the audio, but allowed her to ask Officer Hammer questions “that relate to the
issue of how much pressure he put on Ms. Starr prior to making these
admissions and what the nature of the encounter was between them.” (Tr.,
p.162, L.22 – p.163, L.12.)
The jury found Starr guilty of both charges (possession of marijuana and
paraphernalia), and the court entered a withheld judgment. (R., pp.120, 125126.) Starr timely appealed to the district court. (R., pp.129-131.)
On intermediate appeal, Starr raised two issues: (1) “Did the magistrate
court err in failing to address whether Starr’s admissions were attenuated of [sic]
the taint of the illegal search?”; and (2) “Did the magistrate court err by depriving
Starr of the opportunity to present evidence about the circumstances of Starr’s
admission?” (R., p.154.) The district court denied relief on both claims and
affirmed. (R., pp.196-204.) Starr filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.
(R., pp.209-211.)
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ISSUES
Starr states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the District Court err in affirming the Magistrate, when
the Magistrate did not perform the required analysis of attenuation
before admitting statements made by Starr as she sat on her bed
during an unconstitutional search of her room?
2.
Did the District Court err in affirming the Magistrate, when
the Magistrate deprived Starr of the opportunity to present to the
jury the unplayed portions of Hammer’s audio?
(Brief of Appellant (“Appellant’s Brief”), p.6 (punctuation original).)

The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Starr failed to show the district court erred in affirming the
magistrate’s conclusion that Starr was not entitled to exclusion of her
admissions?
2.
Has Starr failed to show the district court erred in affirming the
magistrate’s discretionary ruling regarding the admissibility of the entire audio of
Starr’s encounter with Officer Hammer, which included reference to evidence
Starr successfully moved to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
Starr Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Affirming The Magistrate’s
Suppression And Evidentiary Rulings
A.

Introduction
Starr contends the district court erred in affirming the magistrate’s ruling

denying Starr’s request to suppress her statements admitting to possessing
marijuana and paraphernalia. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-10.) Starr also contends
the district court erred in affirming the magistrate’s denial of her request to
present the entirety of an audio, portions of which referenced evidence Starr
successfully prevented the state from presenting during its case-in-chief.
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.10-13.) Both of Starr’s arguments fail. Application of the
law to the evidence supports the district court’s decision. Starr was not entitled
to suppression of her statements, nor was she entitled to introduce suppressed
evidence.

Even if Starr could establish error, the district court correctly

concluded any error was harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity, the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s
decision.” State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The
appellate court “examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of fact
and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings.” Id.
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“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [this Court] accept[s] the trial
court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the Court]
freely review[s] the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.”
State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005).
“[T]he trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence at trial
and its judgment will be reversed only when there has been an abuse of
discretion.” State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 973-974, 829 P.2d 861, 863864 (1992) (citations omitted).

C.

Starr Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Affirming The
Magistrate’s Denial Of Starr’s Request To Suppress Her Admissions To
Owning And Possessing The Marijuana And Paraphernalia She Gave To
Officer Hammer
“Because the exclusionary rule imposes a price upon society that can

enable the guilty to escape prosecution, the exclusionary rule is only applicable if
there is a causal connection between the police misconduct and the acquisition
of challenged evidence.” State v. Lusby, 146 Idaho 506, 508, 198 P.3d 735, 737
(Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted).

In deciding whether evidence should be

excluded as “fruit of the poisonous tree,” a court considers three factors: “(1)
The temporal proximity of the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence; (2)
whether there are intervening circumstances between the illegality and the
acquisition of the evidence; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct.” Id. at 509, 198 P.3d at 738 (citations omitted). “The last of the
three factors . . . is particularly important because it comes closest to satisfying
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the deterrence rationale for application of the exclusionary rule.”

State v.

Cardenas, 143 Idaho 903, 910-911, 155 P.3d 704, 711-712 (Ct. App. 2006)
(quotations and citation omitted, ellipses original).
During her interaction with Officer Hammer, Starr admitted, more than
once, that she possessed marijuana and paraphernalia. (Tr., p.14, Ls.10-23,
p.15, Ls.2-20, p.16, Ls.6-12, p.18, Ls.2-12, p.21, Ls.18-20, p.26, Ls.4-7, p.27,
Ls.9-12.) Starr did not expressly request exclusion of her statements until trial,
at which time she objected to the audio clips labelled Exhibits 1C and 1D. (Tr.,
p.96, L.24 – p.97, L.23.) Exhibit 1C is the portion of Officer Hammer’s interaction
with Starr that occurred between 16:00 and 16:45, and Exhibit 1D is the portion
of the interaction that occurred between 19:21 and 20:00. Specifically, defense
counsel argued:
Your Honor, in the motion to suppress hearing, the Court
ruled that, if I can paraphrase my understanding, I guess, is that
the Court disallowed evidence going forward from the time that,
besides the items that were brought out by my client early on in
their interaction. I believe that’s the audio that we’re playing along
1
and plays up till about minute 9:20.[ ]
Over the next five minutes, the officer goes into her room
and proceeds to go about the thing that we’ve discussed already,
Your Honor. At about minute 16, he Mirandizes my client and then
asks her about the items in question, the items that weren’t
suppressed.

1

Exhibit 1A is the portion of the interaction that occurred from the beginning up
to 9:23, and Exhibit 1B is the portion that occurred between 9:40 and 9:49.
Exhibit 1A was originally the beginning of the audio to 9:49, but the magistrate
granted Starr’s request to exclude the portion of the exchange in which Officer
Hammer asks Starr if she had been in trouble before. (Tr., p.81, Ls.6-7, p.86,
L.10 – p.92, L.23.) As a result, Exhibit 1A became the beginning of the audio to
9:23, and Exhibit 1B became 9:40 to 9:49. (Tr., p.93, L.4 – p.96, L.23.)
10

Your Honor, I would argue that, despite the fact that Miranda
was given, it wasn’t knowledgeably, voluntarily waived at that point,
that the officer, that the entire scene from that point was essentially
a continuing transaction as the officer questioned my client about
those items. I think as part of this sanction I’m asking that those
statements be kept out, Your Honor. The reason being that I don’t
see an independent basis that the officer would have had to obtain
those statements. The taint would not have attenuated from the
prior conduct, Your Honor, and so I would ask that both C and D be
kept from trial.
(Tr., p.97, Ls.1-23.)
Addressing Starr’s request for suppression, the magistrate specifically
referenced Lusby, which sets forth the applicable three-factor test applicable to
an attenuation analysis, and stated:
My conclusion is that it would have been appropriate for the
officer to have arrested, he had promised not to, but if he had
arrested her, taken her back to the station, Mirandized her, and
questioned her when she had made admissions, certainly there
would have been nothing inappropriate about that. So does it
somehow matter that it happened in the bedroom and closer in
time to the search of the bedroom, which I have ruled he did not
have consent to make? I think if she was Mirandized and told that
she didn’t have to say anything, and she chose to make
statements, that those things were consensual, and that consent is
not changed by the fact that they were in a place where she did not
consent to a search.
I don’t think that the illegally obtained evidence, mainly the
items that were found in the bedroom, were in any way exploited in
such a way that that exploiting resulted in the obtaining of these
admissions. So I’m going to deny the motion to suppress, if that’s
what it is, those admissions, and will allow those admissions found
in Exhibits 1C and 1D into evidence.
(Tr., p.102, L.6 – p.103, L.10.)
Starr’s complaint on appeal to the district court was that the magistrate
reached this conclusion without “address[ing] attenuation of the taint of the illegal
search.” (R., p.156.) The district court found that, although the magistrate did
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not conduct a full attenuation analysis, the magistrate was not required to do so
because the magistrate “properly concluded that the temporal proximity was not
satisfied,” and, as a result, “there was no need to address the remaining factors.”
(R., pp.200-201.) That the magistrate did not expressly address each factor in
the attenuation analysis does not, however, mean that the magistrate’s analysis
was incomplete. Moreover, application of the three factors to the facts supports
the magistrate’s decision. While the challenged admissions were made close in
time to the search the magistrate found was nonconsensual, suppression is not
automatically required because a court must still consider any intervening
circumstances and the “purpose and flagrancy” of the alleged misconduct.
Lusby, 146 Idaho at 509, 198 P.3d at 738.
While not dispositive, Miranda warnings, which Starr received prior to the
challenged admission, are a relevant consideration in the attenuation analysis.
Cardenas, 143 Idaho at 910, 155 P.3d at 711. As noted by the district court,
there was no contention that Starr’s post-Miranda statements were not voluntary
(R., p.200), and a review of the audio recording reveals that, after receiving
Miranda warnings, Starr readily agreed to talk to Officer Hammer (Exhibit 1C).
That she did so voluntarily, and not as a result of any unlawful action by Officer
Hammer, is consistent with her admissions at the outset of the encounter when
she first responded to Officer Hammer’s request to come in and “deal” with the
marijuana he could smell by telling him she would bring Officer Hammer what
she had, which included a pipe and “two or three bowls of pot.” (Tr., p.14, L.8 –
p.15, L.20; Exhibit 1A at 2:00 – 2:50.)

12

Further, although the magistrate found that the search of Starr’s room was
nonconsensual, Officer Hammer’s conduct was not flagrant, particularly when
considered in the context of the entire encounter. Early in the encounter, Starr
admitted that she had marijuana and paraphernalia inside her apartment and
agreed to give those items to Officer Hammer. Starr subsequently gave Officer
Hammer permission to come inside and wait by the door while she retrieved the
contraband. Officer Hammer’s pursuit of information in relation to those items
and his desire to ensure that all contraband was removed from Starr’s apartment
was anything but flagrant misconduct.

The district court, therefore, correctly

decided that the magistrate did not err in its ruling.
On appeal to this Court, Starr complains that the district court “improperly
placed the burden on [her] to persuade the court that ‘the evidence was obtained
as a result of the illegal activity’ by Officer Hammer.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.9
(quoting R., p.201) (emphasis in quoted material).) Starr further argues that the
district court’s “logic” would require Starr “to testify at the motion hearing, and
persuade the magistrate that the statements were—at least in part—a product of
the Hammer’s [sic] unconstitutional search.”

(Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)

These

arguments reflect either a misunderstanding or a misrepresentation of the district
court’s opinion.
The language Starr quotes in support of her argument is taken out of
context. What the district court wrote was: “But as Lusby directs, the issue is
not one of mere physical proximity, but rather whether the evidence was
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obtained as a result of the illegal activity.” (R., p.201 (emphasis original).) The
district court then wrote:
Had Hammer questioned Starr about the items found in the
bedroom, all of the temporal requirements . . . would be met. He
did not. Rather, he questioned her about the items she had
produced. The jury did not hear any statements attributable to the
suppressed evidence. This Court disagrees with the Magistrate’s
analogy about being taken to the police station, but does conclude
that the Magistrate properly concluded that the temporal proximity
test was not satisfied. Therefore, there was no need to address the
remaining factors.
(R., p.201.)
No reasonable reading of the language Starr quotes, or the district court’s
analysis, supports Starr’s assertion that the district court “improperly placed the
burden” on her, or Starr’s belief that the district court’s “logic” would compel her
testimony at any point in the proceedings. The burden Starr does have is to
show error on appeal, and she failed to meet that burden in the district court, and
has failed to meet that burden before this Court.
Even if this Court concludes Starr has met her burden of showing error in
the admission of Exhibits 1C and 1D, the district court correctly concluded, in the
alternative, that any error was harmless. (R., pp.201-202.) In finding any error
harmless, the district court cited I.C.R. 52 and the “harmless error test
established in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967),” and stated:
This Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the claimed
erroneously admitted statements did not contribute to the verdict.
Starr actually possessed both the pipe and the marijuana. She
admitted smoking it. She clearly had knowledge of the items
because she retrieved them from her room. Whether she
purchased the marijuana or had it given to her, how much she paid
for it, and how often she used it are largely irrelevant to the charges
she faced. Though corroborative, this evidence was not essential
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to the prosecution. The evidence was overwhelming. Any error in
admitting these statements was harmless.
(R., pp.201-202.) The district court was correct.
Pursuant to I.C.R. 52, “Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” “The inquiry is whether,
beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the defendant]
even without the admission of the challenged evidence.” State v. Johnson, 148
Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)); see also
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
Starr’s unchallenged admissions were made early and often in her
encounter with Officer Hammer. (Tr., p.116, L.22 – p.117, L.22, p.119, Ls.1-17,
p.121, Ls.7-9, p.122, Ls.20-21, p.123, L.23 – p.124, L.1.) Those admissions
included Starr stating, “I have a pipe, and I have, like two or three bowls of pot
left” (Tr., p.15, Ls.19-20; Exhibit 1A at 2:40 – 2:45; see also Tr. p.121, L.8, p.123,
L.23 – p.124, L.1), and telling Officer Hammer they had smoked “one pipe, two
bowls between all of [them]” (Exhibit 1A at 7:25 – 7:30; Tr., p.122, Ls.20-21). In
addition, Starr testified in her defense, but never denied possessing either the
marijuana or the paraphernalia. (See generally Tr., pp.170-175.) Instead, Starr
implicitly admitted culpability, testifying that Young told Officer Hammer they had
“been smoking” (Tr., p.173, Ls.17-19), and when asked if there was “anything
else” she wanted to “share” with the jury, she testified:
. . . [T]his whole experience has taught me a lot. It’s not a situation
I ever want to be in ever again. I realize I put not only my well
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being at risk but my children too, and it’s been -- I regret every
minute of it. I can’t explain how deeply I regret it.
(Tr., p.174, L.24 – p.175, L.5).
The incriminating statements Starr made in Exhibits 1C and 1D were no
different for purposes of establishing guilt than Starr’s other admissions. On
Exhibit 1C, Starr tells Officer Hammer the marijuana belongs to her; this was the
same unchallenged admission Starr made from the beginning. On Exhibit 1D,
Starr tells Officer Hammer she bought the marijuana “from somebody,” indicated
how much she paid for it, and stated she did not smoke marijuana “very often.”
While these comments provided details on how Starr obtained the marijuana and
her frequency of use, they were not, as the district court explained, “essential to
the prosecution” in light of Starr’s other admissions, including her trial testimony.
There can be no doubt that a rational jury would have convicted Starr even
without the admission of Exhibits 1C or 1D.
On appeal, Starr argues the district court applied the incorrect “standard
for harmless error review” because, she contends, she was not required to show
“the evidence was essential to the conviction, but rather,” it was the state’s
burden to show the evidence did not contribute to the verdict. (Appellant’s Brief,
p.10.) According to Starr, “the State did not even attempt to meet this burden,
even after the District Court raised the issue at oral argument on appeal.”
(Appellant’s Brief, p.10.) There are several flaws in Starr’s argument.
First, there is no evidence in the record to support Starr’s assertion that
the state “did not even attempt to meet” its burden of showing harmless error
“even after the District Court raised the issue at oral argument” because the
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record on appeal to this Court does not include a transcript of the oral argument
in district court. It is axiomatic that the appellant bears the burden of providing a
sufficient record on appeal to substantiate his or her appellate claims. State v.
Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105, 803 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449, 680 P.2d 869, 871 (Ct. App. 1984). “In the absence
of an adequate record on appeal to support the appellant’s claims, [the appellate
court] will not presume error.” State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 38, 43 P.3d
794, 797 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Beason, 119 Idaho at 105, 803 P.2d at 1011).
To the contrary, any missing portions of the record are presumed to support the
actions of the court below. State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541, 835 P.2d 1349,
1352 (Ct. App. 1992). Starr’s unsupported claim regarding oral argument to the
district court fails.
Second, even if the state did not present any argument on harmless error,
the district court decided the error was harmless, and this Court may review a
decision actually made by the district court. See State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550,
553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998) (issues “argued to or decided by the trial court”
may be considered on appeal).
Third, the district court did not apply an incorrect harmless error standard.
Once again, Starr’s contrary argument reflects either a misunderstanding or a
misrepresentation of the district court’s opinion. The district court clearly cited
the correct legal standard and properly applied it, and nothing in the language
used by the district court can reasonably be construed as imposing upon Starr
the burden of showing anything, much less the burden of showing the challenged
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“evidence was essential to the conviction.” Starr’s argument otherwise is without
merit.
Application of the correct legal standards to the facts shows that Starr has
failed to meet her burden of showing the district court erred either in affirming the
magistrate’s decision to admit Exhibits 1C and 1D or in concluding any error in
the admission of the exhibits was harmless.

D.

Starr Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Affirming The
Magistrate’s Denial Of Her Request To Admit Suppressed Evidence
At Starr’s request, the magistrate suppressed the evidence “found after

the initial items that were brought to the kitchen table.” (Tr., p.64, L.23 – p.65,
L.1; see also p.65, Ls.14-16.) It appears from the record that the suppressed
items included another pipe, a bong, and a box with “ash and stems.” (Tr., p.30,
L.20 – p.31, L.20, p.40, L.21 – p.41, L.3.)

Following the magistrate’s

suppression decision, the state redacted the majority of the audio recording of
Officer Hammer’s interaction with Starr from the point Officer Hammer asked to
search Starr’s room until the end of the recording. (See Tr., p.160, L.17 – p.161,
L.2; Exhibits 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D.) After the state rested, however, Starr moved to
introduce the entirety of the audio. (Tr., p.160, Ls.6-10.) Starr asserted she was
making the request “[i]n light of the way the case ha[d] proceeded,” and “[t]o try
and give a full understanding to the jury.”

(Tr., p.160, Ls.6-14.)

Starr also

agreed that she wanted to introduce the entirety of the audio in order to
“persuade the jury that her admissions were not reliable and that they were
made under . . . some kind of pressure, which render[ed] them unreliable.” (Tr.,
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p.159, L.20 – p.160, L.6.) In other words, Starr sought to vacate the suppression
decision she pursued so that she could argue to the jury that half of the state’s
evidence should be disregarded.

The magistrate correctly rejected Starr’s

request and the district court correctly affirmed that decision.
A court’s determination that evidence is not admissible is generally not
party-specific; it is equally inadmissible for both sides. While a party who seeks
exclusion of evidence may later waive its original objection either by presenting
the evidence itself, or by “opening the door” to the presentation of such
evidence, the ability to do so is not automatic and nothing in the law prevents the
opposing party from objecting to such tactics. See State v. Rupp, 118 Idaho 17,
19, 794 P.2d 287, 289 (Ct. App. 1990) (if defendant opens door regarding
evidence of good character, state may rebut with contrary evidence).

For

example, if the state prepares its case and presents evidence in reliance on an
evidentiary ruling solicited by the defendant, there is no reason the state cannot
seek to enforce that ruling against the defendant. That is what happened in this
case, and, as found by the district court (R., p.203), the magistrate properly
exercised its discretion in balancing the equities and allowing Starr to ask Officer
Hammer questions about the circumstances surrounding her admissions, but not
allowing her to introduce the entirety of the audio (Tr., p.162, L.22 – p.163, L.12).
On appeal, Starr contends the ruling was erroneous because, she argues,
the magistrate’s concern for being “fair to both sides” is “inconsistent with I.R.E.
403’s prerequisite that probative value be substantially outweighed [sic] before
exclusion is proper.”

(Appellant’s Brief, p.13 (footnote omitted).)
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Starr’s

argument ignores the entirety of the magistrate’s discussion of the prejudice to
the state. The magistrate explained:
The bigger issue is whether it gives the jury the impression
that somehow it was the State that was trying to limit the
information that they obtained and that the defense is now
heroically giving them the whole story, when, in fact, it’s exactly the
opposite of what occurred.
I think that’s very unfair to the State, that possibility. I don’t
know whether the jury would look at it that way or not, but that
possibility is very unfair to the State.
(Tr., p.162, Ls.10-18.)
The magistrate’s “fair to both sides” comment was made in relation to its
decision to allow Starr to recall Officer Hammer and ask him questions “that
relate to the issue of how much pressure he put on Ms. Starr prior to making
these admissions and what the nature of the encounter was between them.”
(Tr., p.162, L.22 – p.163, L.3.) Nothing about the magistrate’s analysis of the
prejudice, or its concern about being “fair to both sides” constitutes an abuse of
discretion.
Starr also contends that the exclusion of the entirety of the audio was
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368 (1964), that “the state bears the burden of establishing the voluntariness of a
confession prior to its admission.”

(Appellant’s Brief, p.11.)

This holding is

irrelevant to this case because Starr never moved to suppress any of her
admissions based on lack of voluntariness prior to their admission. (See R.,
p.202 (district court noting lack of any assertion that Starr’s statements were not
voluntary).) To the extent Starr sought to have the jury decide the voluntariness
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of her admissions after they were already admitted, this is precisely what the
Supreme Court in Jackson found problematic.
At issue in Jackson was a state court practice that allowed the jury to
determine the voluntariness of a confession where voluntariness was at issue.
378 U.S. at 375.

The jury was instructed “that if it found the confession

involuntary, it was to disregard it entirely, and determine guilt or innocence solely
from the other evidence in the case.” Id. at 374-375. On the other hand, if the
jury “found the confession voluntary, it was to determine its truth or reliability and
afford it weight accordingly.” Id. at 375. The Supreme Court found this practice
“did not afford a reliable determination of the voluntariness of the confession
offered in evidence at the trial,” and did not protect a defendant’s “right to be free
of a conviction based upon a coerced confession.” Id. at 377. Because “the use
of involuntary confessions” is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
instructed “[i]t is both practical and desirable” that “a proper determination of
voluntariness be made prior to the admission of the confession to the jury which
is adjudicating guilt or innocence.” Id. at 386, 395. A correct reading of Jackson
shows that it is actually contrary to any claim that Starr was entitled to submit
evidence to the jury in an effort to persuade them that her admissions were
involuntary.
To the extent Starr sought to introduce evidence and argue that her
statements were unreliable (as opposed to involuntary), the magistrate’s ruling
allowed her to do so because Starr was expressly permitted to ask Officer
Hammer questions “that relate[d] to the issue of how much pressure he put on
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[her] prior to her making the[ ] admissions and what the nature of the encounter
was between them.”

(Tr. p.162, L.24 – p.163, L.3.)

In addition, nothing

precluded Starr from testifying to the same. That the magistrate did not allow
her to supplement her questioning with the portions of the audio that were
previously excluded is insufficient to show evidentiary error.
Even if this Court concludes that the district court erred in affirming the
magistrate’s exclusion of the entirety of the audio, any error is harmless. Error
can be deemed harmless if there is overwhelming evidence of guilt. State v.
Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, ---, 342 P.3d 628, 630 (2015) (citation omitted). There
was overwhelming evidence of Starr’s guilt, which would have been unchanged
by the admission of the entirety of the audio. Indeed, admission of the entire
audio would have only corroborated the evidence of guilt that was admitted in the
audio’s absence. Moreover, nothing about the entire audio, or Starr’s own trial
testimony, demonstrates that her admissions were unreliable, particularly the
admissions she made from the outset before Officer Hammer even asked to
search her bedroom.

Any error in the exclusion of the entire audio was,

therefore, harmless.
Because Starr has failed to show any error in the district court’s decision
affirming the magistrate’s suppression and evidentiary rulings, she is not entitled
to relief.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
against Starr and the district court’s Memorandum Opinion on Appeal.
DATED this 9th day of September, 2016.

/s/ Jessica M. Lorello_______________
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Deputy Attorney General
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